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Abstract
The reallocation of authority upwards, downwards, and sideways from central states has drawn 
attention from a growing number of scholars in the social sciences. Yet beyond the bedrock 
agreement that governance has become (and should be) multi-level, there is no convergence about 
how it should be organized. This paper draws on various literatures in distinguishing two types of 
multi-level governance. One type conceives of dispersion of authority to multi-task, territorially 
mutually exclusive jurisdictions in a relatively stable system with limited jurisdictional levels and a 
limited number of units. A second type of governance pictures specialized, territorially overlapping 
jurisdictions in a relatively flexible, non-tiered system with a large number of jurisdictions. We 
find that both types co-exist in different locations, and we explain some facets of this co-existence. 
Kurzfassung
Die Umverteilung von Autorität nach oben, unten und seitwärts von Zentralstaaten hat die 
Aufmerksamkeit einer steigenden Anzahl von Sozialwissenschaftern auf dieses Thema gelenkt. 
Schon vom Urabkommen an, das besagte, dass Regieren eine Mehrebenen-Angelegenheit 
geworden ist (und dies auch sein solle), gibt es keine Konvergenz dahingehend, wie dies 
organisiert sein sollte. Dieses Papier bezieht sich auf verschiedenste Literatur, die zwei Typen von 
Regieren in Mehrebenensystemen unterscheidet. Eine Art begreift die Verteilung von Autorität auf 
Mehrebenen-Aufgaben als territorial gegenseitig ausschließende Zuständigkeiten in einem relativ 
stabilen System mit limitierten zuständigen Ebenen und einer beschränkten Anzahl von Einheiten. 
Ein zweiter Typ von Regieren beschreibt spezialisierte, territorial überlappende Zuständigkeiten in 
einem relativ flexiblen, nicht abgestuften System mit einer großen Anzahl von Zuständigkeiten. 
Wir kommen zu dem Schluß, dass beide Typen nebeneinander an verschiedenen Orten existieren 
und wir erklären einige Facetten dieser Koexistenz.
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1 Introduction   
New forms of governance and the re-allocation of authority have gained the attention of a large and 
growing number of scholars in economics, political science, sociology, international relations, and 
public policy and administration.(1) On the one hand, decision-making has spilled beyond core 
representative institutions. Public/private networks of diverse kinds have multiplied at every level 
from the smallest to the largest scale. On the other hand, formal authority has been dispersed from 
central states both up to supranational institutions and down to subnational governments. This 
process has been broad and deep. A recent survey finds that 63 of 75 developing countries have been 
undergoing some decentralization of authority (Garman et al. 2001: 205). A detailed index drawn up 
by the authors of this paper finds that no EU country became more centralized since 1980, while half 
have decentralized authority to a regional tier of government (Hooghe and Marks 2001). The last two 
decades have also seen the creation of a large number of transnational regimes, some of which, 
including above all the European Union, exercise real supranational authority.  
We begin by discussing strategies for systematic empirical investigation of governance. We then 
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we find that both types co-exist in different locations, and in the following sections of the paper, we 
explain some facets of this co-existence. We do this by refining efficiency arguments, which are well 
known in the literatures on governance, and by suggesting that the development of governance is 
characterized by path dependence.  
This paper is merely a first step in a larger enterprise. To explain existing governance one must do 
more than analyze efficiency and path dependency. We believe that a valid theory requires taking 
political variables seriously (Marks and Hooghe 2000). And this paper is intended to prepare the 
ground for a political analysis.  
2 Data on Governance   
Dispersal of authority has generated intense intellectual curiosity and scientific inquiry. At the 
present time, the fields that have engaged authority across advanced industrialized democracies 
provide descriptions, models, and case studies, but all too rare attempts to gather and analyze basic 
data. Much of the empirical work that has been accomplished is concerned with the efficiency of 
alternative jurisdictional arrangements rather than with their incidence.(2)  
Comparative data would enable us to get on with the real task of any scientific endeavor—that of 
building disconfirmable knowledge. What would such data consist of? Let us begin with a basic 
dependent variable: the jurisdictional allocation of authority, ranging from monopoly in a single 
jurisdiction to dispersion across a very large number of jurisdictions.  
2
Take any group of people in a given territory—say Oudenaarde, a small river town along the Scheldt 
in Belgium. How many jurisdictions exercise authority over the lives of people living in this territory 
at a given point in time? One, five, one hundred, one thousand? So a first approximation to 
measuring multi-level governance is to say it varies with the number of jurisdictions bearing on 
individuals in a particular territory. But this measure must be refined if it is to be meaningful. First, it 
must take account of the distribution of policy competencies across jurisdictions. Second, it must 
take particular account of fiscal power—the power to tax and spend. Third, a weighted measure of 
multi-level governance must take account of formal and informal power relations among 
jurisdictions. We discuss these briefly in turn.  
Counting the number of jurisdictions tells one nothing about the allocation of policy competencies 
among them. One strategy is to draw up a list of policy areas, and assess how authority over each of 
them is allocated. This is the approach of students of federalism (Riker 1964; Alexander 1974; 
Elazar 1991; Watts 1999), decentralization (Prud’homme 1995), European integration (Deutsch 
1954, 1957; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; Schmitter 1996; Pollack 2000; Hooghe and Marks 
2001), and regional and global regimes (Mattli 1999; Litfin 1997; Nye and Donahue 2000). To be 
useful, such lists must disaggregate. Riker examines the distribution of authority between federal and 
state governments in American federalism across 17 categories (1964). Lindberg and Scheingold 
(1970), and Schmitter (1996) assess the relative roles of European and national governments across 
22 and 28 policy areas respectively.  
Some competencies are far more important than others. Constitutional authority—the authority to 
change formal decision making rules—is fundamental to governance. A distinguishing characteristic 
of a federal polity is that constitutional authority is shared by governments at different levels, rather 
than monopolized by central government (Elazar 1987).  
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is monetized, the fiscal role of a jurisdiction can be measured precisely.(3) There are various ways to 
calculate fiscal or financial clout. The simplest measure is relative or absolute fiscal revenues or 
expenditures (before or after transfers). A more sophisticated measure would take into account 
whether a jurisdiction is entitled to raise taxes, i.e. to define the tax base, rather than simply lower or 
increase the rate, and the extent to which transfers to and from other jurisdictions are compulsory or 
discretionary, and conditional or unconditional. Students of fiscal federalism have developed 
indicators taking into account some or all these distinctions in order to analyze central-local 
government relations (Alexander 1974; Bird and Vaillancourt 1998; Riker 1964, 1987; Lane and 
Ersson 1999; Page and Goldsmith eds. 1987; Oates 1972, 1999; Vaubel 1994; Watts 1999; for a 
recent application to Latin-America, see Garman et al. 2001).  
Yet a focus on distribution of policy responsibilities or fiscal revenues/expenditure does not capture 
the dynamics of authoritative decision-making under multi-level governance. Except in the extreme 
case of a single government that monopolizes power, one has to ask how different jurisdictions 
interact with one another. Are the relationships characterized by hierarchy, do they reflect mutual 
dependence, asymmetrical dependence, or relative independence? What, in William Riker’s words, 
is “the nature of the bargain?” To answer this question, one must pay attention to both formal and 
informal institutions. What, then, are the formal rules constraining interjurisdictional relations? For 
example, are regional governments represented in a senate at the federal level that can veto certain 
policies? Are there routinized meetings between federal and state executives at which binding 
decisions are made? Or, at the international level, is there an independent arbitration panel that can 
make authoritative decisions?  
3
As William Riker has stressed, a narrow focus on formal institutions is likely to underestimate 
informal relationships. If decision makers at different levels of a federal polity are coordinated in a 
centralized political party, the polity may be far more centralized than it formally appears. In his 
analysis of American federalism in comparative perspective, Riker argues that political pressures—
and, in particular, the structure of the party system—are decisive in shaping the federal bargain 
(Riker 1964, 1987). In the same vein, Garman, Haggard, and Willis emphasize the role of the party 
system in understanding the dynamics of decentralization and centralization in Latin America 
(2001).  
Riker was concerned with the domestic arena, but his observation has particular force for politics 
beyond the national state. International decision rules are generally less formally institutionalized, 
and so there is usually more space for political dynamics to shape the outcome. For example, Keck 
and Sikkink have argued that active lobbying by transnational social movements and advocacy 
coalitions has been a significant force in internationalizing certain policy issues (1998).  
We have focused above on a basic dependent variable present in much of the literature on multi-level 
governance: the extent to which authority for a particular territory is dispersed across multiple 
jurisdictions. However, this does not capture variation along the following dimensions of multi-level 
governance:  
l Are jurisdictions general-purpose or specialized?  
l Are jurisdictional territories mutually exclusive or overlapping?  
l Are jurisdictions stable or fluctuating?  
A test of alternative theories of multi-level governance would require systematic data on the basic 
variable as well as on these additional dimensions. Some of these data are available, but not easily 
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3 Two Visions   
Over the past two decades, scholars across social science disciplines have sought to describe how 
governance has been changing in western societies. One intellectual response has been to stretch 
well-established concepts over the new phenomena. Scholars of federalism have applied their 
approach to power sharing among as well as within states. International relations scholars have 
begun to extend theories of international regimes to political decentralization within states. Another 
response has been to generate entirely new terms and concepts. These include multi-level 
governance, multi-tiered governance, polycentric governance, multi-perspectival governance, FOCJ 
(functional, overlapping, competing jurisdictions), fragmegration (or SOAs), and consortio and 
condominio.  
Each of these terms has its own particularities, but all refer to the dispersion of authority away from 
central government—upwards to the supranational level, downwards to subnational jurisdictions, 
and sideways to public/private networks.(4) The common evolution of similar ideas in diverse places 
can be explained partly as diffusion from two “Ur” literatures—federalism and new institutionalism. 
But we suspect that this remarkable intellectual convergence is also the result of independent 
invention in response to common political development. In this paper, we do not summarize the 
particularities of the concepts that have been put forward, nor do we do justice to the intellectual 
history of the field. Instead we mine the relevant literatures for some conceptual benchmarks in order 
to facilitate empirical analysis.  
4
A common element across these literatures is that the dispersion of governance across multiple 
jurisdictions is both more efficient than and normatively superior to central state monopoly. Most 
important is the claim that governance must operate at multiple scales in order to capture variations 
in the territorial reach of policy externalities. Because externalities arising from the provision of 
public goods vary immensely—from planet-wide in the case of global warming to local in the case 
of most city services—so should the scale of governance. To internalize externalities, governance 
must be multi-level. This is the core argument for multi-level governance, but there are several other 
perceived benefits. For example, more decentralized jurisdictions can better reflect heterogeneity of 
preferences among citizens.(5) Multiple jurisdictions can facilitate credible policy commitments 
(Majone 1998; McCubbins and Page 1987). Multiple jurisdictions allow for jurisdictional 
competition (Frey and Eichenberger 1999; Weingast 1995, 2000). And they facilitate innovation and 
experimentation (Gray 1973).  
However, beyond the bedrock agreement that governance has become (and should be) multi-
jurisdictional, there is no convergence about how multi-level governance should be organized. We 
detect two contrasting visions.  
The first conceives of dispersion of authority to a limited number of non-overlapping jurisdictions at 
a limited number of levels. Jurisdictions in this system of governance tend to bundle authority in 
quite large packages; they are usually non-overlapping; and they are relatively stable. We label this 
Type I governance.(6)  
A second distinctive vision of governance pictures a complex, fluid, patchwork of innumerable, 
overlapping jurisdictions. These jurisdictions are likely to have extremely fungible competencies, 
which can be spliced apart into functionally specific jurisdictions; they are often overlapping; and 
they tend to be lean and flexible—they come and go as demands for governance change. We 
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Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of Type I and Type II governance as ideal-typical 
constellations of values along continuous dimensions. The first two dimensions capture variation 
among individual jurisdictions, while the latter three describe systemic properties.  
Table 1  
3.1 Type I governance   
The intellectual home base for Type I governance is federalism, which is concerned with power 
sharing among a limited number of governments operating at just a few levels. The main thrust of 
federalism in the context of the national state is the relationship between central government and a 
tier of non-overlapping sub-national governments. The unit of analysis is the individual government, 
rather than the individual policy. In the words of Wallace Oates, dean of fiscal federalism, “the 
traditional theory of fiscal federalism lays out a general normative framework for the assignment of 
functions to different levels of government and the appropriate fiscal instruments for carrying out 
these functions” (Oates 1999: 1121; Oates 1972). The framework is system-wide; the functions are 
bundled; and the levels of government are multiple but limited in number.(7) These basic features 
are part and parcel of federalism, and more broadly, of the study of intergovernmental relations; they 
also characterize Type I governance.  
5
Multi-task jurisdictions. Federalists and students of intergovernmental relations emphasize the 
difficulty of decomposing authority into very small packages. Instead, authority is parceled in multi-
task bundles among a limited number of usually pre-existing sub-central governments. This idea is 
especially strong in Europe where local government usually exercises “a wide spread of functions, 
reflecting the concept of general-purpose local authorities exercising comprehensive care for their 
communities” (Norton 1991: 22).  
Jurisdictions with mutually exclusive territorial boundaries. Students of federalism and 
intergovernmental relations conceive of jurisdictions as mutually exclusive at any particular level. 
Regional boundaries within a given country are non-overlapping. This extends the Westphalian 
principle of exclusive territoriality into the domestic arena (Caporaso 2000: 10; Krasner 1999).(8)  
A system of multi-task and mutually exclusive jurisdictions sets a ceiling on the dispersion of 
authority. Systemic characteristics of Type 1 governance are as follows:  
Limited number of jurisdictions. Jurisdictions tend to be large enough to carry out multiple tasks. A 
motivation for local government amalgamation during the 1970s in several European countries was 
that existing local governments were perceived to be too small to function efficiently.  
Limited number of jurisdictional levels. Dispersion of authority is constrained by limiting the 
of levels of authority. Calculating the optimal number of levels of government in a political system is 
a major topic among students of intergovernmental relations. It is common to distinguish a local, an 
intermediate, and a central level, but the utility of additional levels of authority is debated.(9) When 
in Belgium decades of nationalist tensions made the creation of a new regional and community tier 
inevitable, many scholars argued that this would make the existing intermediate level of provinces 
redundant. Analyzing developments in the early 1990s, Frank Delmartino, a long-time student of 
Belgian intergovernmental relations, writes “The size of the regions makes every intermediate body 
between them and the communes totally redundant. At best the provinces can be used as a 
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independent policy body, their role is over. . . . In a country like Belgium, in the long run this status 
is nothing less than a death sentence” (Delmartino 1993: 59). Dispersion of authority across six 
layers of government—local, interlocal, provincial, regional, community, and national—was 
considered wasteful.  
Quasi-permanent jurisdictional system. Jurisdictional reform—that is, creating, abolishing or 
radically adjusting new jurisdictions—is costly. While it is true that “a well-functioning federal 
system is . . . always a candidate for change,” such change normally consists of re-allocating policy 
functions across existing levels of governance (Nicolaidis 2001: 446). Change in the number of units 
or number of levels of governance is rare. The institutions responsible for governance are sticky, and 
they often survive long after the conditions that brought them into being have ended. Since the 
creation of the German federal state in 1949, students of German federalism have argued that the 
boundaries of some Länder should be redrawn to reflect current externalities. These arguments 
gained force after German unification, but, so far, boundaries have been redrawn only in Berlin.  
6
Type I governance is not limited to federalism and intergovernmental relations. It captures a notion 
of governance common among many European Union scholars. Elsewhere, we have described the 
re-organization of authority in the European Union as “a polity-creating process in which authority 
and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of government—subnational, national, 
and supranational. While national governments [remain] formidable participants in EU policy 
making, control has slipped away from them” (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 2). Alberta Sbragia 
observes that, “The decision-making process evolving in the Community gives a key role to 
governments—national government at the moment, and . . . subnational government increasingly in 
selected arenas.” (Sbragia 1992: 289). European integration and regionalization are viewed as 
complementary processes in which central state authority is dispersed above and below the national 
state (Ansell 2000; Bache 1998; Bomberg and Peterson 1998; Börzel and Risse 2000; Börzel 2001; 
Burgess 2000; Jeffery 1996; Keating 1998; Kohler-Koch 1998; Marks, Hooghe, Blank 1996; Sbragia 
1993; Scharpf 1988, 1994). Few observers expect the outcome to be as neat and orderly as a classical 
federation. Yet fewer believe that the final product will be an Escher’s paradise of territorially 
variable, functionally specific, overlapping, non-hierarchical networks. Governments, according to 
Sbragia, “will continue to be central actors” because “the territorial claims that national governments 
represent . . . are exceedingly strong. It is nearly impossible to overestimate the importance of 
national boundaries as key organizers of political power and economic wealth in the European 
Community” (Sbragia 1992: 274, 289; for a skeptical view, see Peters and Pierre 2000).  
Type I governance dominates thinking in international relations among those describing the 
modification—but not elimination—of the Westphalian state (Caporaso 2000). These scholars do not 
deny that transnational movements, public-private partnerships, and corporations play important 
roles in international regimes, but they highlight the staying power of national states. Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye argue that, “Contrary to some prophetic views, the nation-state is not about 
to be replaced as the primary instrument of domestic and global governance. . . . Instead, we believe 
that the nation-state is being supplemented by other actors—private and third sector—in a more 
complex geography” (Keohane and Nye 2000a: 12).  
3.2 Type II governance   
An alternative vision of multi-level governance is one in which the number of jurisdictions is vast, 
rather than limited; in which jurisdictions are not aligned on just a few levels, but operate at diverse 
territorial scales; in which jurisdictions are functionally specific rather than multi-task; and where 
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neoclassical political economists and public choice theorists, but it also summarizes the ideas of 
several scholars of federalism and international relations.  
Task-specific jurisdictions. In Type II governance, multiple, independent jurisdictions fulfill distinct 
functions. This leads to a governance system where “each citizen . . . is served not by ‘the’ 
government, but by a variety of different public service industries. . . . We can then think of the 
public sector as being composed of many public service industries including the police industry, the 
fire protection industry, the welfare industry, the health services industry, the transportation industry, 
and so on” (V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom 1999: 88-89). In Switzerland, where Type II governance is 
quite common at the local level, these jurisdictions are aptly called Zweckverbände—goal-
oriented/functional associations (Frey and Eichenberger 1999).  
7
Territorially overlapping jurisdictions. According to Alessandra Casella and Barry Weingast, “There 
is generally no reason why the smaller jurisdictions should be neatly contained within the borders of 
the larger ones. On the contrary, borders will be crossed, and jurisdictions will partly overlap. The 
‘nested,’ hierarchical structure of the nation-state has no obvious economic rationale and is opposed 
by economic forces” (Casella and Weingast 1995: 13).  
Bruno Frey and Reiner Eichenberger coin the acronym FOCJ (functional, overlapping, and 
competing jurisdictions) for this form of governance (Frey and Eichenberger 1999). Vincent Ostrom 
and his collaborators adopt the term “polycentric,” to describe the co-existence of “many centers of 
decision-making that are formally independent of each other” (V. Ostrom, Tiebout, Warren 1961: 
831; see also V. Ostrom 1999a, 1999b). Polycentricity initially described metropolitan governance in 
the United States, which has historically been considerably more fragmented than that in Europe. 
This sparked a four-decade long research program at Indiana University, led by Elinor and Vincent 
Ostrom, into the conditions and normative implications of diffusion of authority across multiple, 
overlapping, fluid jurisdictions in a variety of settings.(10) These individual features combine to lift 
any limits to the dispersion of authority under Type II governance. The jurisdictional system that 
emerges has the following characteristics.  
Large number of jurisdictions. Each collective action problem shared by a group of citizens can give 
rise to a new jurisdiction. So the number of jurisdictions tends to be much larger than under Type I 
governance.  
Many jurisdictional levels. Type II governance is organized across a large number of levels. Instead 
of conceiving authority in neatly defined local, regional, national, and international layers, public 
choice students argue that each public good or service should be provided by the jurisdiction that 
effectively internalizes its benefits and costs. A range of public goods demand jurisdictions at a 
range of scales. Something akin to a marble cake emerges. Students of Type II governance generally 
speak of multi- or poly-centered governance, which, they claim, have less a ring of hierarchy to them 
than the terms multi-level or multi-tiered governance.  
The notion that the number of jurisdictions and levels of governance have proliferated permeates the 
writings of many international relations scholars. This work extends polycentric governance into the 
international arena. One of the most vocal critics of the traditional statist view of governance 
describes this process as “fragmegration”—a neologism suggesting “the simultaneity and interaction 
of the fragmenting and integrating dynamics that are giving rise to new spheres of authority and 
transforming the old spheres. It is also a label that suggests the absence of clear-cut distinctions 
between domestic and foreign affairs, that local problems can become transnational in scope even as 
Seite 7 von 24 EIoP: Text 2001-011: Full Text
12.10.01 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-011.htmglobal challenges can have repercussions for neighborhoods.” What emerges is a global system that 
is “so disaggregated that it lacks overall patterns and, instead, is marked by various structures of 
systemic cooperation and subsystemic conflict in different regions, countries and issue 
areas” (Rosenau 1997: 38). The neat scales, or levels, or tiers, disappear—they meld into one 
another. There is no up or under, no lower or higher, no dominant class of actor; rather, a wide range 
of public and private actors compete or collaborate in shifting coalitions. This is like Escher’s 
famous lithograph of incongruously descending and ascending steps.  
Flexible jurisdictional system. Type II jurisdictions are intended to be flexible rather than permanent 
in order to respond to changing citizen preferences and functional requirements. The idea is rooted in 
Charles Tiebout’s argument that mobility of citizens among multiple competing jurisdictions 
provides a functional equivalent to market competition (Tiebout 1956). In a subsequent article, 
Vincent Ostrom, Charles Tiebout, and Robert Warren describe a polity in which groups of citizens 
band together in “collective consumption units” to procure public goods. Individual citizens can join 
or leave particular collective consumption units, and these units can procure a public good in one of 
several alternative ways—for example, by producing it themselves, hiring private producers, 
subsidizing local community groups, or joining up with other jurisdictions (V. Ostrom, Tiebout, 
Warren 1961; Ostrom and Ostrom 1999). A defining characteristic of polycentric governance is “the 
concurrence of multiple opportunities by which participants can forge or dissolve links among 
different collective entities” (McGinnis 1999a: 6). In his advocacy of FOCJ, Bruno Frey emphasizes 
a similar jurisdictional flexibility: “FOCJ . . . are flexible units which are established when needed . . 
. [And] FOCJ are discontinued when their services are no longer demanded as more citizens and 
communities exit and the tax base shrinks” (Frey and Eichenberger 1999: 18). “FOCJ are an 
institutional way to vary the size of public jurisdictions in order to minimize spillovers. A change in 
size is, therefore, a normal occurrence” (Frey and Eichenberger 1999: 41).  
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Under Type II governance, the capacity to take collective decisions, and make them stick, is shared 
among a wide variety of actors. As Elinor Ostrom and James Walker put it, “The choice that citizens 
face is not between an imperfect market, on the one hand, and an all-powerful, all-knowing, and 
public-interest-seeking institution on the other. The choice is, rather, from among an array of 
institutions—all of which are subject to weaknesses and failures. . . . These include families and 
clans, neighborhood associations, communal organizations, trade associations, buyers and producers’ 
cooperatives, local voluntary associations and clubs, special districts, international regimes, public-
service industries, arbitration and mediation associations, and charitable organizations” (Ostrom and 
Walker 1997: 36). Type II governance comprises dispersed self-rule on the part of diverse voluntary 
groups. Collective action problems are dealt with in heterogeneous arenas mobilized by many kinds 
of groups.(11)  
Several writers point out that Type II governance resembles pre-modern governance. John Ruggie 
identifies commonalities between contemporary and medieval “multiperspectival” governance 
(Ruggie 1993). He argues that “the medieval system of rule comprised a ‘patchwork of overlapping 
and incomplete rights of government’ (Strayer and Muro 1959: 115), which were ‘inextricably 
superimposed and tangled,’ and in which ‘different juridical instances were geographically 
interwoven and stratified, and plural allegiances, asymmetrical suzerainties and anomalous enclaves 
abounded’ (Anderson 1974, 37-38)” (cited in Ruggie 1998: 146). Students of polycentric governance 
trace the prevalence of special districts and other forms of polycentric governance in the United 
States back to the conception of federalism anchored in the US constitution (Ostrom 1999b). 
Analysts of multi-centered governance in Europe find inspiration in pre-modern theories of 
federalism. The father of societal federalism, Johannes Althusius, formulated his ideas against Jean 
Bodin’s unitary conception of the state (Nicolaidis 2001; Elazar 1987; Elazar and Kincaid eds. 2000; 
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The conceptions of multi-level governance we have identified are distinct but not mutually 
exclusive. The question we ask next is how do they fit together.  
4 Where Does One Find Type I and Type II Governance?   
4.1 Locating Type I Governance  
Type I governance—multi-task, territorially mutually exclusive jurisdictions in a relatively stable 
system with limited jurisdictional levels and a limited number of units—predominates in 
conventional territorial government up to the national level.  
Dispersion of authority in Type I governance has taken place in many parts of the world since World 
War II. The past two decades have seen widespread decentralization of authority from central states 
to regions and localities. Examples include the reallocation of certain federal competencies to US 
states and Canadian provinces, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the regionalization of Russia, 
regionalization in Latin America, and decentralization in China and India (Bird and Vaillancourt 
1998; Casella and Weingast 1995).  
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In the European Union, Type I governance has been pressed forward by the simultaneous 
empowerment of subnational and supranational institutions (Goldsmith and Klausen 1998; Ansell, 
Parsons and Darden 1997; Kohler-Koch 1998; Bomberg and Peterson 1998; Keating and Hooghe 
1996). Table 2 presents an index summarizing regionalization—the main component of subnational 
empowerment—in the 14 larger EU countries since 1950. The greatest changes have been in France, 
Italy, Spain and Belgium. France and Italy have seen partial constitutional reforms strengthening 
subnational governments and creating popularly elected regional parliaments. Beginning in the 
1970s, with democratization, Spain has become a quasi-federal polity. Belgium has been 
transformed from a relatively centralized state into a federal regime run mainly by regional 
governments. The United Kingdom has seen devolution to Scotland and Wales with assemblies for 
English regions on the agenda. No EU country has become more centralized since 1980, while half 
have decentralized authority to a regional tier of government (Hooghe and Marks 2001).  
This dispersion of authority follows the logic of Type I—not Type II. As Table 3 shows, the overall 
structure is relatively simple, even elegant. There are few rather than many tiers. The very lowest 
tiers of communal government are not represented in the table, but in no country are there more than 
three additional levels of government beyond those accounted for in the table. So the territorial 
scales of government across the EU range between three and six. This is a far cry from the near 
infinite jurisdictional dispersion conceived in Type II governance.  
Table 2  
Table 3  
Table 4 summarizes the changing balance of national and European decision making across 28 issue 
areas in four broad categories: economic policy, social/industrial policy, legal/constitutional policy, 
and international relations. In 1950, policy making in all issue areas was determined exclusively in 
territorial states. In 2000, not a single policy area was exclusively national.  
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The EU combines Type I and Type II governance. The bulk of EU policies, with the major exception 
of monetary policy, apply to a single unified jurisdiction. The EU bundles together a variety of 
internationalized policy competencies that are handled elsewhere by numerous, overlapping, and 
functionally specific jurisdictions. However, some salient features of EU architecture appear 
consistent with Type II governance: variable territorial jurisdictions as a result of treaty derogations; 
distinct governance systems or “pillars” for different policies; the multiplication of independent 
European agencies; the flexibility clause of the Amsterdam Treaty specifying the conditions under 
which a subset of member states can engage in greater integration.  
4.2 Locating Type II Governance   
Type II governance—specialized, territorially overlapping jurisdictions in a relatively flexible, non-
tiered system with a large number of jurisdictions—appears strongest at the edges of Type I 
governance, in the following niches:  
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4.2.1 Public/private frontier   
While we do not have a precise count of Type II jurisdictions at the nexus between public and 
private, such as firms, interest groups, and community groups, it seems clear that their number has 
grown enormously over the past two decades. Type II governance of product standards and health & 
safety standards has, for example, mushroomed in Europe and throughout the developed world. 
Some jurisdictions are entirely run by private actors according to the principle of self-regulation, 
while others exercise formal authority. In general, such standard-setting jurisdictions are task-
specific, arm’s length from traditional government, largely autonomous, and territorially 
overlapping.  
Space has opened up for Type II governance as formal government has shrunk in the process of 
privatization, outsourcing, administrative decentralization, and the shift from redistributive policies 
and discretionary management to market regulation (Majone 1994). For example, public ownership 
of the rail system in Britain has been replaced by private provision organized on a contractual basis 
with central government. This is Type II governance, not market competition. Central government 
remains accountable for the quality of service, but private firms contract with the government to 
provide it and, for the duration of the contract, they exercise considerable autonomous authority in 
doing so. In the US, many state governments have farmed out the management of prisons to private 
companies; in some US states, collection of certain tax arrears is outsourced to private collection 
agencies.  
4.2.2 The national/international frontier   
Type II governance is ubiquitous in efforts to internationalize transnational spillovers in the absence 
of authoritative coordination (i.e. hierarchy) (Rosenau 1997; Hocking 1999). Some Type II 
transnational jurisdictions coordinate state actors; others coordinate a mix of state and non-state 
actors; while others are entirely non-state.  
More than 150 international environmental treaties have been agreed among states, half of them 
since 1970 (Clark 2000). The territorial scale of these regimes varies from global to regional 
(including patchworks of non-contiguous territories). Most target functionally specific policy 
problems ranging from aircraft engine emissions, climate change, ozone layer protection, shipment 
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Much transnational governance is primarily nongovernmental (Clark 2000; Young 1999). Some 
jurisdictions authorize self-regulation among firms (e.g. the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development). There are a very large number of issue-specific transnational governance 
arrangements among more than 25,000 international nongovernmental organizations (Clark 2000). A 
global civil society of functionally specific, territorially overlapping, and fluid jurisdictions is 
responsible for policy making at the national/international frontier (Lipschutz 1996).  
4.2.3 Densely populated frontier regions of bordering states   
Type II governance in the form of inter-regional commissions, task forces, and inter-city agencies is 
the norm for densely populated frontier regions in North America and Western Europe. Ad hoc, 
problem driven, coordination has blossomed along the US/Canadian border and in numerous trans-
border conurbations in Europe. In the Upper Rhine Valley, for example, the Swiss cantons of Basel-
Land and Basel-Stadt, the French département Haut Rhin, and the German district Basel-Stadt have 
developed a wide range of trans-national jurisdictions, including routinized meetings of regional 
government leaders, a regional council of parliamentary representatives, a conference of city mayors, 
boards of regional planners, associations of local authorities, agricultural associations, chambers of 
commerce, cooperation projects among universities, joint research projects on regional climate 
change and biotechnology, teacher exchange programs, and school partnerships (Weyand 1996).  
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The institutional architecture of frontier governance is most developed in Belgium, Germany, and 
the Netherlands where a trans-national association, Euregio, connects public and private actors at 
multiple levels. Such arrangements are brokered by regional politicians, but most of the action is left 
to private actors who set up their own collaborative arrangements. The European Commission has 
actively supported Type II governance with seed money and ongoing funding. One of its best-known 
programs, Interreg, explicitly aims to facilitate inter-regional networks along the European Union’s 
internal and external borders.  
Governance arrangements that straddle national borders are usually functionally specific; they 
overlap with established subnational jurisdictions; they encompass non-contiguous territories; and 
they are viewed as ad hoc, problem-solving endeavors.  
4.2.4 Where local government interacts with community associations   
Type II governance may well be most prevalent at the local level, though we lack comparative data. 
We have fairly detailed data on Switzerland, where Frey and Eichenberger identify six types of 
functional, overlapping, competitive jurisdictions (FOCJ) that complement or compete with 
traditional, multi-task local governments. These communes, of which there are around 5,000, 
perform specialized tasks, such as organizing local schooling, or providing electricity, gas, water, or 
street lighting. In addition, hundreds of inter-communal associations provide specialized public 
goods at a larger scale, including for example, hospitals, nursing homes, or garbage collection. 
According to the authors’ calculations, there were 178 such associations in the canton of Zurich 
alone in 1994. Most communes and some associations of communes have the power to raise taxes; 
the territorial boundaries and conditions for membership vary from type to type; and the governing 
boards of some communes are directly elected (Frey and Eichenberger 1999: 49-53). The functional 
equivalent in the United States are the “special districts,” which, as in Switzerland, have variable 
territorial boundaries and perform specific tasks (Casella and Weingast 1995; for assessments, 
Dowding, John, and Biggs 1994; Inman and Rubinfeld 1997).  
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though “partnership between a whole variety of service providers and levels of [local] government is 
the normal practice in most West European countries” (Batley 1991: 225). But nowhere do Type II 
jurisdictions overshadow Type I local government. Frey and Eichenberger concede that traditional 
communes constitute the most important form of governance in Switzerland (Frey and Eichenberger 
1999: 50).  
Type II governance may also appear where local communities are faced with local common pool 
resource problems, that is, where scarce, renewable resources—for example, a water basin, a lake, an 
irrigation system, fishing grounds, forests, hunting grounds, common meadows—risk depletion 
because it is difficult to restrict access. Elinor Ostrom has demonstrated how communities around 
the world have developed task-specific governance structures, often self-generated, to cope with 
common pool resources (Ostrom 1990; also Keohane and Ostrom 1995). We know there are many 
such examples, but we do not know what the total would amount to.  
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5 Explaining Type I and Type II Governance   
Why have two distinct types of multi-level governance emerged? And why do we find them in 
distinct parts of society? These questions motivate our analysis of jurisdictional change. A first step 
is to mine and refine some basic efficiency and path dependency arguments.  
5.1 Efficient responses to problems of inter-jurisdictional coordination   
To the extent that policies of one jurisdiction have spillovers (i.e. negative or positive externalities) 
for other jurisdictions, so coordination is necessary to avoid socially perverse outcomes. The larger 
the externalities, the greater the potential harm, and the greater are the benefits of inter-jurisdictional 
cooperation. However, coordination costs tend to rise exponentially as the number of jurisdictions 
rises.  
Fritz Scharpf has gone further than anyone else in investigating the conditions under which 
cooperation is possible under multi-level governance. It seems to us fitting to call the basic dilemma 
underlying interjurisdictional negotiation Scharpf’s law: “As the number of affected parties 
increases . . . negotiated solutions incur exponentially rising and eventually prohibitive transaction 
costs” (Scharpf 1997: 70).  
The simplest way to understand this is to think through the impact of increasing numbers of players 
in an iterated prisoners’ dilemma. A two-player game provides certainty of repeated interaction, and 
this permits strategies based on tit for tat to effectively punish defection.(12) As the number of actors 
rises beyond two, it becomes harder to punish defectors. Free riding is the dominant strategy in the 
absence of a leviathan or of countervailing norms that can induce a sufficiently large proportion of 
actors to monitor and punish defection. This is, in a nutshell, the dilemma of multi-level governance.  
How can multi-level governance escape the coordination conundrum? An efficiency logic suggests 
two possible solutions, and these, we believe, provide a key to the types of governance that we have 
described above.  
Type I governance diminishes coordination costs by limiting the number of jurisdictions and by 
setting up multi-task, general-purpose jurisdictions with non-overlapping territorial borders. As a last 
resort, Type I governance often imposes “a shadow of hierarchy” across jurisdictions (Scharpf 
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body—has the final word.  
A hierarchical authority structure may facilitate negotiation among a plurality of actors without 
directly controlling them, as Scharpf has observed in the German federal bureaucracy (1997: 198). 
Political actors, in this case ministerial civil servants, bargain directly with each other in horizontal 
fashion, but have the option of appealing their case to a higher authority, the Federal Chancellory. 
This threat induces both sides of a dispute towards compromise when it is unclear who will prevail at 
the superior level.  
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Similarly, theorists of polycentric governance speak of nesting local jurisdictional arrangements 
within an “overarching political, economic, and cultural order” (McGinnis 1999a: 2). Vincent and 
Eleanor Ostrom note that, “cooperative arrangements maintained under a rule of unanimity can 
always be threatened by the presence of a holdout where multiple collective consumption and 
production units are creating significant externalities for one another. If those externalities have the 
characteristics of a public good in a large domain that impinges upon several collectivities, one 
collectivity may find it advantageous to hold out and enjoy the benefits it can derive from the joint 
actions of others without assuming its proportionate share of the costs” (Ostrom and Ostrom 1999: 
96). They go on to point out that, “with overlapping units of government, conflicts among 
governments at any one level may be resolved by recourse to the decision-making arrangements 
existing at a higher level of government” (96-97), including particularly the courts.  
Type I governance limits the costs of coordination by constraining the number of jurisdictions and 
by imposing a “shadow of hierarchy” across them. Looking over the institutional architecture 
summarized in Table 3, one can observe the following design principles:  
l Non-intersecting jurisdictions. Governments located at the same level do not overlap with 
each other. They are separated by permanent, clearly articulated, borders. Moreover, the 
territories of more territorially extensive governments at higher tiers do not intersect the 
territories of less extensive governments at lower tiers. That is to say, NUTS 1 units are neatly 
contained within their respective states, as are NUTS 2 units within individual NUTS 1 units, 
and so on for progressively smaller levels.  
l Sharply cascading scale. The scale of governance more than doubles at each successive level. 
Levels are widely separated and are correspondingly limited in number.  
l Multiplex competencies. The competencies that are dispersed across jurisdictions are bundled 
into a small number of packages. This limits cross-jurisdictional spillover.  
l System-wide institutional architecture. One does not arrive at sharply cascading, multiplex, 
non-intersecting governance by accident. Systemic institutional choice is written all over the 
structures listed in Table 3.  
Even highly decentralized Type I governance systems are normally bound together by a single court 
system. This leads Joe Weiler to argue that even federal systems have a strong measure of hierarchy: 
“Federal state constitutions create, always, a vertical hierarchy of a triple nature: a hierarchy of 
norms which, in turn, is rooted in a vertical hierarchy of normative authority which, in turn, is 
situated in a hierarchy of real power” (Weiler 2000: 2).  
Type II offers an alternative solution to the problem of coordination under multi-level governance. 
Its line of defense is to limit spillover among jurisdictions by compartmentalizing, so that each 
government is solely responsible for a particular policy. Type II sets no ceiling on the number of 
jurisdictions or on task-specialization. It spawns a large number of jurisdictions while minimizing 
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dividing tasks within an organization into what Herbert Simon has called “nearly decomposable” 
structures. Nearly decomposable structures are those in which the ratio of internal to external 
interactions is maximized. That is to say, the short-run behavior of actors across different 
governments is more or less independent of the other, while their long-run behavior is only 
connected in the aggregate (Simon 1996: 178).  
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How can decomposability be attained in policy provision? How can one break up policy making into 
discrete pieces demanding internal coordination with minimal external spillover? The following 
design principles characterize Type II governance:  
l Functional specificity. Specific competencies are hived off, and insulated, in separate 
jurisdictions. Jurisdictions are numerous and intersect, but they are relatively inert with respect 
to each other.  
l Low level of distributional conflict. The emphasis in each jurisdiction is on pareto optimality 
in problem solving rather than distributional bargaining with societal-wide consequences.  
l Ad hoc, policy-specific, architecture. The unit of political engineering in Type I governance 
is the jurisdiction; in Type II governance it is the individual policy problem.  
The advantage of numerous overlapping jurisdictions is that different authoritative functions can be 
tailored to different constituencies. Also, problem-solving capacity is enhanced within small 
jurisdictions. But this solution is efficient only to the extent that policy solutions can be targeted at 
particular problems with well-defined constituencies. The gist of this line of thinking is that Type I 
and Type II governance are good at different things, and co-exist because they are complementary. 
The result is a large number of functionally differentiated Type II jurisdictions that are relatively 
self-contained (i.e. which do not impose major externalities for other jurisdictions) alongside a 
smaller number of multi-purpose Type I jurisdictions in which coordination is made less costly by 
their relatively small number and their non-intersecting territoriality.  
5.2 Path dependence   
Why do Type II jurisdictions cluster at the edges of Type I jurisdictions? To understand this, we 
must investigate the costs of institutional change. Two transaction costs are, we believe, decisive, 
and we discuss them in turn.  
5.2.1 Decisional barriers   
Barriers to change for Type I jurisdictions are often high, sometimes extremely high. Two things 
have to happen in order to create a new jurisdiction. First, reformers must coordinate to bring the 
change about. Second, they must surpass whatever decisional barriers stand in their way.  
It seems likely that the vast majority of pareto-optimizing jurisdictions are never proposed because 
those who benefit remain unorganized. To the extent that potential jurisdictions compete with actual 
jurisdictions, this is often an uneven struggle between a potential government and an actual 
government. If power is the arbiter, the odds will usually be heavily in favor of interests already 
organized and vested in established jurisdictions.  
In addition, jurisdictions, particularly of Type I, are frequently mandated by decisional rules that 
make change difficult. The territorial scope and competencies of Type I institutions are often set out 
in constitutions that can only be changed by super-majority. A defining characteristic of federalism 
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The more rooted a jurisdiction is in other institutions, the higher the barriers to change. Many Type I 
jurisdictions have elected legislatures, formally constituted executives, and civil services. 
Eliminating a jurisdiction will often entail far-reaching change for the scope, competencies, and 
perhaps survival, of these institutions. Hence, when reform of Type 1 governance takes place, it 
typically involves reallocating competencies across existing jurisdictions, rather than creating 
entirely new jurisdictions.  
Fundamental jurisdictional change is rare in the absence of the collapse of a regime in war or 
revolution. Federal polities in West Germany and Austria were established after World War II. 
Federalization in Spain became possible with the transition to democracy once the Franco regime 
collapsed. Once new jurisdictional boundaries were established in Germany, Austria, and Spain, they 
have remained unchanged. Unification in Germany added new jurisdictions, but did not change 
existing ones, save in Berlin. Punctuated equilibrium is exactly what one would expect given the 
considerable transaction costs of jurisdictional reform (Krasner 1984; Spruyt 1994).  
Once a level of governance is established, it is likely to become a magnet for additional 
competencies—even if this is not optimal from a pure efficiency standpoint. Path dependence arises 
due to increasing returns to concentration of competencies in existing jurisdictions. The logic is 
similar to that of increasing returns to scale in location theory: the transaction costs of allocating an 
additional competence to an existing jurisdiction are often less than the costs of establishing a new 
jurisdiction. If, as we speculate, Type I governance is characterized by such path dependence, then 
this will constrain the location of Type II governance.  
5.2.2 Territorial identity   
Some jurisdictions, particularly Type I jurisdictions, have intrinsic meaning for citizens. Citizens 
may identify with a particular territorial community represented in a particular jurisdiction. 
Nationalism, which is one variant of this, has been an immensely powerful force in jurisdictional 
reform.  
Many political economists and some scholars of fiscal federalism have tried to encompass identity in 
their models under the rubric of heterogeneity of policy preferences. But this is flawed. Identity 
expresses an intrinsic sense of belonging to a particular group rather than a preference across some 
set of policies. Members of a group can value self-government even if it involves some sacrifice of 
other goods, including realization of policy preferences.  
Resistance to creating or empowering supranational jurisdictions is often rooted in identity rather 
than efficiency. Opposition in the United States to the International Court Tribunal or NAFTA, for 
example, is often expressed in terms of defence of national sovereignty against the incursion of 
foreign authority. Evidence from expert surveys reveals that the extent to which political parties in 
Europe support further integration is powerfully shaped by their degree of nationalism (Hooghe, 
Marks, and Wilson 2001). Opposition to the EU is associated with what we call Tan values—
traditionalism, authoritarianism, and nationalism.  
Territorial identity can change, but it usually does so over decades rather than years. Identity is 
therefore a force for jurisdictional stability. Durable jurisdictions can intensify territorial identity. 
Eurobarometer surveys reveal that regional attachment is particularly strong—stronger, in fact, than 
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There are several cases in which identity strains against existing jurisdictional arrangements, as in 
the several nations of Europe that are sub-jurisdictions within larger states. This is a potential source 
of sudden change. The one European country that has undergone radical jurisdictional surgery in the 
absence of war or regime transformation is Belgium, as a result of powerful identity pressures.  
6 Conclusion   
The types of governance that we have discussed in this paper share one vital feature: they are sharp 
departures from the model of the all-powerful central state. Political fordism is their common target. 
Multi-level governance, in contrast, involves dispersion of authority. However, there are distinct 
ways to institutionalize this. One is to allocate competencies in bundles to a limited number of non-
overlapping governments, each catering for a particular territory at a particular scale. This limits the 
sheer number of jurisdictions and thereby facilitates coordination while gaining most of the scalar 
benefits of multi-level governance. An alternative, more radical, strategy is to disperse competencies 
among a very large number of overlapping governments. To the extent that the policies pursued by 
these governments do not spill over to neighboring jurisdictions, so the task of coordination is 
limited.  
Not much attention has been paid to the normative implications of these alternative visions. If we 
have nudged this debate forward then we have achieved one of our goals. But we doubt whether 
much progress can be made in evaluating costs and benefits of alternative types of governance 
without good comparative data on what forms of governance exist where and with what results. 
Without good data there can be neither good prescriptive theory nor good social science.  
Our second and principal goal has been to ask where these types of governance might be found and 
why they co-exist. Our evidence consists mostly of stylized facts, except for Type I multi-level 
governance in the European Union, and our answers are tentative. We draw on Fritz Scharpf’s work 
in developing an account of coordination among multiple jurisdictions. And we set out a framework 
for examining jurisdictional path dependence. We ignore the political choices of key political actors, 
and we ignore political coalitions, not because we believe these to be unimportant, but because their 
decisive causal role needs to be explicated in an institutional context such as the one we set out here.  
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Endnotes  
(1) We define governance as authoritative rule making. Such rule making encompasses making, 
implementing and adjudicating rules. Our focus is on the political realm, that is, on the legitimate 
exercise of power, as distinct from governance in corporations, private associations and families.  
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12.10.01 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-011.htm(2) The work of Oates, Inman and Rubinfeld, and the Indiana Workshop led by Vincent and Elinor 
Ostrom stand out as attempts to systematically test some of the many extant hypotheses and models 
that are on offer (for overviews, see Oates 1999; Inman and Rubinfeld 1997; Dowding, John, and 
Biggs 1994; McGinnis 1999a, 1999b, 2000).  
(3) One can also count government employees, although to less effect. The number of persons 
employed by a government is heavily biased in favor of governments responsible for policy 
implementation. Such governments may, or may not, shape the content of that policy.  
(4) While we have used the term multi-level governance to describe this, any one of the terms in the 
list above would serve just as well.  
(5) Assuming that this heterogeneity can be jurisdictionally captured. For most purposes, this 
demands that heterogeneity is territorial, so that groups with distinct preferences have a separate 
territorial government, or that heterogeneity is socially pillarized, and thus amenable to 
consociational arrangements. Moreover, the greater the number of jurisdictions, the higher the 
informational demands on citizens who are assumed to fully understand the costs/benefits of 
alternative jurisdictional arrangements. This assumption is often unrealistic, as has been 
demonstrated even at the local level, where opportunities for accurate citizen information are greatest 
(Lowery et al. 1995; Hoogland DeHoog, Lowery, and Lyons 1990).  
(6) For the present, we have chosen not to use technical terms to describe these types.  
(7) Traditional federalism studies focused primarily on constitutional federations, which reduced the 
universe to a handful of primarily western cases (e.g. Riker 1964; Wheare 1953; but not Daniel 
Elazar 1987, 1991). Contemporary work on (fiscal) federalism focuses more broadly on the benefits 
and costs of centralization vs. decentralization of authority. This expands the universe of cases in 
two directions. First of all, it enables scholars to apply insights from federalism to all countries with 
some form of non-unitary rule. Hence the wave of studies on decentralization in former non-
democratic countries (Besley and Coate 1999; Inman and Rubinfeld 1997; Panizza 1999; 
Prud’homme 1995; Treisman 1999). In the second place, relaxing federalism to include non-
constitutional dispersion of authority has induced students of federalism to examine diffusion of 
authority beyond the national state. Applying categories from American federalism, Inman and 
Rubinfeld have analyzed the dynamics of fiscal federalism in post-EMU European Union (Inman 
and Rubinfeld 1992). Alberta Sbragia, Fritz Scharpf, Daniel Elazar, Barry Weingast, Dominique 
Bureau, Alessandra Casella, Alberto Alesina, Roland Vaubel among others, have done the same 
(Alesina and Wacziarg 1999; Alesina, Perotti, and Spolaore 1995; Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg 
2000; Bureau and Champsaur 1992; Casella and Frey 1992; Casella and Weingast 1995; Sbragia 
1992, 1993; Scharpf 1988; Vaubel 1994). Yet the premises of this recent literature are the same: 
“how many local and state governments there should be; how they will be represented in the central 
government; and how policy responsibilities should be allocated between the central government and 
the lower tiers” (Inman and Rubinfeld 1997: 43). The levels of jurisdictions are limited—usually two 
or three, and sometimes four; the number of jurisdictions is restricted; and policy competencies are 
bundled.  
(8) Consociational rule is an exception. Dutch and Swiss consociationalism provided religious 
communities with self-government in education, health care, and welfare services. Religious 
affiliation, not territory, determined whether an individual was subject to catholic or protestant 
authority.  
(9) In many European countries, the intermediate, or meso, level is a post-WWII institutional 
innovation. As Jim Sharpe observes: “What seems to be a near-universal phenomenon over the last 
twenty years or so in the Western European state, namely the emergence of an intermediate level of 
government between the centre and the basic municipal or communal level . . . The meso constitutes 
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12.10.01 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-011.htmone of the most important institutional changes in the modern Western state” (Sharpe 1993:1).  
(10) Michael McGinnis, a long-time collaborator of the Ostroms, defines a political order as 
polycentric “when there exist many overlapping arenas (or centers) of authority and responsibility. 
These arenas exist at all scales, from local community groups to national governments to the 
informal arrangements for governance at the global level. . . . A sharp contrast is drawn against the 
standard view of sovereignty as connoting a single source of political power and authority that has 
exclusive responsibility for determining public policy” (McGinnis 1999b: 2).  
(11) James Rosenau distinguishes between eight types of collectivities (2001).  
(12) The classic "tit-for-tat" makes minimal demands on memory, and is therefore the simplest 
strategy within an extensive family of more demanding strategies that can punish defection under 
less restrictive assumptions about incomplete information. (See Lindgren 1991 for an intriguing, but 
rarely cited, simulation of this.)  
©2001 by Hooghe & Marks 
formated and tagged by S.H.,4.10.2001 
Seite 24 von 24 EIoP: Text 2001-011: Full Text
12.10.01 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-011.htmTable I 
Types of Multi-Level Governance 
Table II 
Regional Governance in the European Union, 1950-2000 
TYPE I TYPE II
multi-task jurisdictions task-specific jurisdictions
mutually exclusive jurisdictions at any particular 
level overlapping jurisdictions at all levels
limited number of jurisdictions unlimited number of jurisdictions
jurisdictions organized in a limited number of levels no limit to the number of jurisdictional 
levels
jurisdictions are intended to be permanent jurisdictions are intended to be flexible
  Year Constitutional 
federalism  
(0-4) 
Special 
territorial 
autonomy  
(0-2) 
Role of regions in 
central government 
 
(0-4)
Regional 
elections  
(0-2) 
Summary 
score  
(0-12) 
Austria 1950 
1970  
1990 
2000
4 
4  
4  
4
0  
0  
0 
0
2  
2  
2 
2
2 
2 
2  
2
8 
8  
8 
8 
Belgium 1950 
1970  
1990 
2000 
1 
1  
3 
4 
0  
0  
1 
1
0 
0  
2  
2
2  
2  
1  
2
3  
3  
7  
9 
Denmark 1950  
1970 
1990 
2000
0 
0  
0  
0 
1  
1  
1 
1 
0 
0  
0  
0
0  
0  
0 
0 
1  
1  
1  
1 
Finland 1950 
1970 
1990 
2000
0  
0 
0  
0 
1  
1  
1  
1 
0  
0 
0 
0
0 
0 
0  
0 
1 
1 
1  
1 
France 1950 
1970 
1990 
2000
0  
1  
2  
2 
0  
0  
0.5  
0.5 
0  
0  
0 
0
0 
0  
2  
2 
0  
1 
4.5 
4.5 
Germany 1950 
1970 
1990 
2000
4  
4  
4 
4 
0 
0  
0 
0 
4 
4 
4  
4
2  
2  
2  
2 
10  
10 
10  
10 
Greece 1950  0  0   0  0   0 
Seite 1 von 7 EIoP: Text 2001-011: Tables
12.10.01 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-011t.htmTable 2 measures regional governance along two dimensions: the extent to which a regional 
government exercises authority independently from central government, and the extent to which a 
regional government participates in national or European decision making. (1)  
We apply Daniel Elazar’s notion that federalism combines self rule (autonomy) with shared rule 
(power sharing) (Elazar 1987). We evaluate self-rule by scoring constitutional federalism, special 
territorial autonomy and regional elections. We evaluate shared rule by scoring the role of regions in 
central government. For country-by-country details of coding decisions see Hooghe and Marks, 
2001.  
I. Constitutional Federalism  
Constitutional federalism taps the formal scope of regional government within the state as a whole. 
We assign one point for each of the following characteristics:  
l existence of a functioning regional tier of government  
l extensive authoritative competencies, including two or more of the following: authority to tax; 
control over police; education policy (including tertiary education); cultural policy; transport 
and communications policy; economic development; local government; and authority to 
1970 
1990 
2000
0 
0 
1 
0  
0 
0 
0 
0  
0
0  
0  
0 
0  
0  
1 
Ireland 1950 
1970 
1990 
2000
0  
0  
0 
0 
0 
0  
0  
0 
0 
0  
0  
0
0 
0  
0 
0 
0 
0 
0  
0 
Italy 1950 
1970  
1990  
2000
0  
0  
2 
3 
1  
1  
0  
0 
0 
0 
0 
1
0  
2  
2  
2 
1  
3  
4 
6 
Netherlands 1950 
1970 
1990 
2000
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0  
0  
0 
0 
0  
0  
0
2 
2  
2 
2 
3 
3  
3 
3 
Portugal 1950 
1970 
1990 
2000
0 
0  
1 
1 
0  
0 
1  
1 
0 
0 
0  
0
0 
0  
0 
0 
0  
0  
2  
2 
Spain 1950  
1970 
1990 
2000
0 
0 
3 
3 
0  
0  
2  
2 
0  
0 
0  
1
0  
0  
2 
2 
0  
0 
7 
8 
Sweden 1950 
1970 
1990 
2000
0 
0  
0 
0 
0 
0 
0  
0 
0 
0 
0  
0
0  
0 
0  
0 
0  
0  
0 
0 
United 
Kingdom
1950  
1970  
1990  
2000
0  
1  
1  
1 
1  
1  
0  
2
0  
0  
0  
0
0  
0  
0  
0 
1  
2  
1  
3 
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regional elections)  
l specific regional competencies that are constitutionally guaranteed  
l federal state in which constitutional change is co-decided by the central state and regions.  
These features are usually, but not always, cumulative. That is to say that the first characteristic is a 
requisite for the second, the second a requisite for the third, and the third a requisite for the fourth.  
[Back to table] 
II. Special Territorial Autonomy  
By special territorial autonomy we refer to the decentralization of authority to territorial minorities, 
not merely deconcentration of administration. Our scale varies from 0.5 to 2 and is derived by 
multiplying scores for the following criteria:  
l authoritative competencies:  
0.5 = weak authoritative competencies;  
1 = extensive authoritative competencies (same as entry for constitutional federalism)  
l population coverage:  
1 = special arrangements for home rule for less than ten percent of the population;  
2 = special arrangements for home rule for more than ten percent of the population.  
Footnote 
(1) We define as ”regions” as the most authoritative tier of intermediate government. Intermediate 
level governance is equivalent to NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 regions in the European Union’s 
categorization (Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques), which we reproduce here in 
Table 3. Regions in our analysis range from Valle d’Aosta with a population of 119,000 to the 17.9 
million in the case of North Rhine-Westphalia—a range that is similar to that among states in the 
United States. The regional level in a country may shift over time if regional institutions are 
reformed. This is the case for Belgium, where the region replaced the province in the early 1980s as 
the dominant meso level of government.  
[Back to table] 
III. Role of Regions in Central Government  
We distinguish two kinds of power sharing. First, regions can share rule because they collectively 
constitute a national legislature, usually a second chamber composed of representatives of regional 
parliaments or regional executives. Second, regional governments may share executive power to the 
extent that regional ministers and civil servants regularly negotiate legislation or executive decisions 
with their counterparts in central government.  
l legislative power sharing:  
1= a chamber in the national legislature composed of representatives of regional governments 
or parliaments without wide-ranging legislative veto power  
Seite 3 von 7 EIoP: Text 2001-011: Tables
12.10.01 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-011t.htm2 = a chamber in the national legislature composed of representatives of regional governments 
or parliaments with wide-ranging veto power  
l executive power sharing:  
1 = regular intergovernmental meetings between central state and regional executives without 
authority to reach binding decisions  
2 = regular intergovernmental meetings between central state and regional executives with 
authority to reach binding decisions  
[Back to table] 
IV. Regional elections  
l 1 = the regional assembly is indirectly elected  
2 = the regional assembly is directly elected  
[Back to table] 
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European Regional Divisions 
Note: NUTS division as revised in 1995 by Eurostat. Source: Antonia Casellas & Catherine Galley 
(1999).  
  NUTS 1  N  NUTS 2  N  NUTS 3  N  
Austria  Gruppen von 
Bundesländern 
3  Bundesländer  9  Gruppen von 
Politischen Bezirken 
35  
Belgium  Regio’s/ Régions  3  Provincies/ Provinces  10  Arrondissements  43  
Denmark  –  1  –  1  Amter  14  
Finland  Manner-Suomi/ Åland  2   Suuralueet  6  Maakunnat  19  
France  ZEAT + DOM  8+1  Régions + DOM  22+4 Départements + DOM  96+4  
Germany  Länder  16  Regierungsbezirke  40  Kreise  543  
Greece  Groups of development 
regions 
4   Development regions  13  Nomoi  51  
Ireland  –  1  –  1  Regional authority 
regions 
8  
Italy  Gruppi di regioni  11  Regioni  20  Provincie  103  
Luxembourg  –  1  –  1  –  1  
Netherlands  Landsdelen  4   Provincies  12  COROP-regio’s  40  
Portugal  Continente+Regioes 
autonomas 
2  Commissaoes de coordenaçao 
regional + Regioes autonomas 
5+2  Grupos de Cancelhos  30  
Spain  Agrupaciones de 
comunidades autonomas 
7  Comunidades autonomas + 
Ceuta y Melilla 
17+1  Provincias  50  
Sweden  –  1  Riksområden  8  Län  24  
United 
Kingdom 
Standard regions  11  Groups of counties  35  Counties/local 
authorities areas 
65  
EU    77    207    1030 
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Issue Arenas and Levels of Authority in Europe: 1950-2001 (1)  
Key:  
1 = All policy decisions at national level  
2 = Only some policy decisions at EC level  
3 = Policy decisions at both national and EC level  
4 = Mostly policy decisions at EC level  
5 = All policy decisions at EC level.  
Issue arena  1950 1957 1968 1992 2000 
ECONOMIC POLICY 
Goods/services  1   2   4 (3)  4   4  
Agriculture  1  1  4  4  4  
Capital flows (2)  1  1  1  4  4  
Persons/workers (3)  1  1  2  3  4  
Transportation  1  2  2  2  3 (2)  
Energy (4)  1  2   1  2  2  
Communications  1  1  1  2  3 (2)  
Environment (5)  1  2  2  3  3  
Regional development (6)  1  1  1  3  3  
Competition  1  2  3 (2)  3  3  
Industry (7)  1  2  2  2  3 (2)  
Money/credit  1  1  2  2  4 (5)  
Foreign exchange/loans  1  1  3 (2)  2  4  
Revenue/taxes  1  1  3 (2)  2  3 (2)  
Macroeconomic (8)  1  1  2   2  4 (3)  
SOCIAL/INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
Work conditions  1  1  2  2  3  
Health  1  1  1  2  2  
Social welfare  1  2  2  2  2  
Education and research  1  1  3 (2)  2  3 (2)  
Labor-management relations  1  1  1  1  3 (2)  
LEGAL-CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY 
Justice and property rights (9)  1  1  1  3  4 (3)  
Citizenship (10)  1  1  1  2  3  
Participation  1  1  2 (1)  2  2  
Police and public order (11)  1  1  2 (1)  1  2  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS/EXTERNAL SECURITY  
Commercial negotiations  1  1  3  5  5  
Economic-military assistance  1  1  1  2  4 (2)  
Diplomacy and membership of international organizations 1  1   2 (1)  2  4 (3)  
Defense & war  1  1  1  2  3 (2)  
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(1) Source for estimates, 1950-1968: Lindberg and Scheingold (1970: 67-71). Source for estimates, 
1992-2000, Schmitter (1996b: 125-126). Estimates for 1992 and 2000 are based on projections from 
existing treaty obligations and obligations undertaken subsequently. Schmitter's scores were based 
on judgments provided by Geoffrey Garrett, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, Philippe C. Schmitter and 
David Soskice in March 1992. Scores in parentheses ( ) for 1968 represent ex post revaluations in 
March 1992 of the original scores in Lindberg & Scheingold by Garrett et al. Scores in parentheses 
( ) for 2000 represent ex post revaluations in March 2000 of the original scores in Schmitter by 
Hooghe and Marks.  
(2) Category not in Lindberg & Scheingold. Schmitter estimates for 1950-1968.  
(3) Category not in Lindberg & Scheingold. Schmitter's estimates for 1950-1968.  
(4) Category not in Lindberg & Scheingold. Schmitter's estimates for 1950-1968.  
(5) Defined as ”Exploitation and protection of natural resources” in Lindberg & Scheingold.  
(6) Category not in Lindberg & Scheingold. Schmitter's estimates for 1950-1968.  
(7) Called ”Economic development and planning” in Lindberg & Scheingold.  
(8) Called ”Counter-cyclical policy” in Lindberg & Scheingold.  
(9) Category not in Lindberg & Scheingold. Schmitter's estimates for 1950-1968.  
(10) Category not in Lindberg & Scheingold. Schmitter's estimates for 1950-1968.  
(11) Called ”Public health, safety and maintenance of public order” in Lindberg & Scheingold.  
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